On 5 September 2019 the sixth Embrace Dialogue Academia seminar was held, on the decision by influential FARC commanders to rearm, and the future of the Colombian peace process. Academics from British universities met with practitioners in the Institute of the Americas, University College London, and reached a general consensus: for peace to survive, the government must step up the pace of implementation of all dimensions of the peace agreement.

The decision of Iván Márquez and other commanders of the FARC-EP to return to arms is the result of a crisis in the peace process that has been evolving since the 2016 Peace Referendum, which academics and other observers have repeatedly warned about, emphasising that many peace processes fail within the first 10 years, when the physical integrity and political participation of former combatants are not guaranteed. The attacks on the Special Jurisdiction for Peace created uncertainty among the FARC; the killing of social leaders and ex-combatants echoed the destruction of the Unión Patriótica (UP) in the 1980s, reinforcing the lack of security guarantees for political opposition; and the case against Jesús Santrich for his alleged involvement in drug trafficking, and the extradition of Marlon Marín to the US, reinforced the FARC’s distrust.

Rodrigo Londoño’s decision to remain in politics, and the public repudiation of Iván Márquez’s decision by the FARC political party, embodies a division in the FARC leadership. The majority of ex-combatants (90%) stand by Londoño and remain committed to peace; this is objectively not the end of the peace process. It is at a critical moment, however; concerns include the reconfiguration of armed groups across Colombia, potential future alliances between Márquez and FARC dissident leader Gentil Duarte, and an unstable international context vis-à-vis Venezuela; a possibility exists for a new cycle of violence in Colombia to escalate into an international conflict situation. Reactions by the Duque administration and the Centro Democrático party are not encouraging; their attacks on the transitional justice mechanisms continue, and some advocate for a total war on what they call ‘terror’.

There are opportunities in the crisis. First, critics of the peace process might reflect on the security dividends they have witnessed recently – Colombia has experienced the lowest levels of violence in the last forty years. Second, as people unite around defending the peace agreement, local elections could reject political opposition to the peace process. Third, a reinvigorated civil society could emerge claiming ownership of the peace agreement.

To date, implementation of the agreement has overcome obstacles thanks to support from the international community. It is still possible to save the peace process, but this depends on the government’s response. We urge the international community to leverage the government to fully implement the peace agreement as it was designed – paying equal respect to all six points.

Márquez’s decision should not be used to justify increased violence and stigmatization against the FARC party; in the current situation, particular attention is needed to improve the implementation of point three – on the security guarantees for ex-combatants and their socio-economic reincorporation. To counter political violence in the run-up to the October elections, implementation of point two, on the broadening of political participation, also requires urgent attention.